As a centralized state power, China intervenes in local economy through effective fiscal and administrative measures. Local finances play a significant role in Chinese governmental activities, providing financial support in various fields, such as infrastructure, education and culture. Local finance is also a mirror of local economics. Local fiscal revenues and economic conditions influence each other, interacting as both cause and effect. Some experts in geoeconomics have studied regional economic disparities through spatial variations of GDP. This paper, however, considers it more profound and multilevel to study the development of local economy from the perspective of fiscal revenues in the context of Chinese governmental interventions. This paper originally offers specific and concrete details of local fiscal revenues by calculating differences of spatial distribution of nominal and disposal fiscal revenues, providing new explanations for the controversial issue on whether regional economic disparities are expanding or not.
.
Regional difference has always been an important issue for geographers, economists and government regulators. Since the reform and opening up, China's economic achievements has been globally acknowledged. However, regional gaps emerge as an inevitable problem at the same time, existing among the east, middle, and west region of China, and between different provinces and even different areas within provinces. Although a series of national policies on regional economic coordination have been implemented since 2000, such as Western Development, Revitalization of Old Industrial Bases in Northeast China and Rise of Central China, the problem of regional disparities remains. Long-term stable growth of national economy and social harmony are largely restricted by the regional discordance of economic development. Fiscal capacity to some extent reflects local economic strength, for smaller economy leads to weak fiscal strength, making it hard to make ends meet. So when comparing regional economic differences, it will be more convincing to measure it from the disparities of fiscal revenue.
Review of the Literature
In recent years, experts have done a lot of researches in regional fiscal disparities.
Relevant studies started from 1999 in China, and earlier in international academia.
International Research on Disparities of Fiscal Revenue
Wide disparity of fiscal strength among regions is a common problem faced by nations of transitional economies. According to Mclure's analysis (1994) on distribution of taxing power and fiscal federalism in Russia, wide disparities of fiscal strength exist among regions in Russia, which mainly result from unbalanced distribution of natural resources [1] . After relevant studies of several countries, such as Brazil, India, Russia and Switzerland, Prudhome (1995) finds out that inappropriate fiscal decentralization might gather resources in only a few areas [2] . By comparing government financial conditions of Brazil and China, Kee (2003) offers political suggestions on how to balance fiscal disparities among governments of different regions [3] . With intense research on fiscal disparity between countries in the Southeast Asia and China, Hofinan and Gurra (2004) discover that internal regional fiscal disparities of China, Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam remain still quite wide, although .the system of transfer payments can to some extent stabilize and compensate such disparities [4] . [14] . With empirical studies, no reliable conclusion is yet agreed on the equalization of disparities of regional fiscal revenue brought by central transfer payments. Zeng Junping (2000) argues that transfer payments from central to local governments have widened the gap of per capita fiscal revenue among regions [15] . Liu Rongcang and Jiao Guohua (2002) and Dabla-Norris (2005) hold the view that there are no obvious changes in disparities of fiscal strength among regions after transfer payments [16] [17] . Using the coefficient of variation, Liu Liang (2007) measures the inequality and concludes that the disparities of per capita fiscal revenue among regions have been narrowed to some extent after central transfer payments [18] . Although transfer payments have narrowed the disparities of fiscal strength among provinces and the three major areas of China, Cao Junwen and Luo Liangqing (2006) think that the transfers have also expanded the internal gap of fiscal strength within the Middle and West China [19] . Jiang Qing (2007) has drawn a similar conclusion, suggesting that in terms of county finances, transfer payments have in fact widened their disparities [20] .
Research on Disparities of Fiscal Revenue in China
With regard to research methods of spatial difference, descriptive statistical methods like Gini coefficient, coefficient of variation and extremum are frequently adopted [21] [22] [23] . In the use of data, most scholars in China adopt GDP per capita [24] [25], some make use of disposable personal income [26] and very few experts choose fiscal revenue as data [23] The results of the paper might bring new inspirations on the debatable issue in the academia.
Innovative Distinction between Disposable Fiscal Revenue and Actual Fiscal Revenue
First of all, few researches on disparities of regional development are based on fiscal revenue. In existing related studies, few of them take actual fiscal revenue, or even complete fiscal revenue into account. Less rigorous data will lead to less reliable outcomes. The author believes that we can analyze the development of local government in accordance with the fiscal revenue only if we have obtained actual data.
In consideration of China's special conditions, Chinese government generally only publishes budget sheets instead of detailed tables of final fiscal accounts.
Since budget sheets certainly serve as a strong constraint on government's consumption and investment, the deviation between final revenue and budget revenue is less than 10% for most local governments. Given the unavailability of detailed data of final accounts, the author considers it feasible to use budget revenue alternatively. This paper originally defines local fiscal revenue as two types-disposable fiscal revenue and actual fiscal revenue ( Table 1 ).
The actual fiscal revenue, the most authentic fiscal revenue in author's opinion, reflects fiscal capacity of local governments, which equals the sum of the annual budget revenue for general purposes and revenue of funds of local governments, revenue of extrabudgetary special financial accounts and last year's surplus minus transferred money, transfer payments and subsidies of all kinds. 
Research Method
This paper adopts Theil index which is able to decompose differences in the study. Theil index, also called Theil's entropy measure, was named after Theil Theil's L is an extension of Theil's T, but less prevalent: This paper uses fiscal data of China's prefecture-level administrative districts, therefore, we are able to investigate differences within each province and across the country.
The Basic Situation of Local Finances and Differences of Fiscal Revenue

The Basic Situation of Local Finances
This paper calculates disposable fiscal revenue per capita and actual fiscal revenue per capita according to the population of every prefecture-level cities in that very year. According to Figures 1-6 , the annual disposable fiscal revenue per capita does not strictly follow the pattern, which is high in the east and low in the west. On the contrary, the data become high in the northwest and low in the southeast. After removing transfers and subsidies of all kinds, it is found that the distribution of actual fiscal revenue per capita become more acceptable. In developed coastal areas, the actual fiscal revenue per capita is quite high. However, in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, it is still on the high side. The paper considers 
Differences and Tendencies of Fiscal Revenue within Provinces
In terms of each province, we apply Theil's T to disposable fiscal revenue and Conclusion 2. The government's instructions about transfers and subsidies seem to be optimized continuously, because the number of the provinces whose Theil indexes rise after accepting transfers and subsidies is on the decrease from 1999 to 2009. Conclusion 3. Over the decade from 1999 to 2009, the disparities of disposable fiscal revenue within each province keep decreasing, owing to the state effective transfer payments and subsidies. Irrespective of these factors, the disparities of actual fiscal revenue within provinces rise year by year. Although transfer payments and subsidies have effective impacts on balancing disposable capital across local governments, they have not cultivated the independence of each province on addressing problems, resulting in widening disparities of actual fiscal revenue within provinces. This also fully testifies that the experts have no agreement on whether disparities of fiscal revenue tend to increase or decrease, possibly due to different statistical calibers.
The Decomposition of Disparities of National Fiscal Revenue
According to the decomposability of Theil index, we decompose annual Theil index into contributions within and among provinces. The outcomes are presented in Table 2 and Figure 8 . As for the whole country, national disparities of both disposable and actual fiscal revenues increase year by year, with different growth rates.
Transfer payments and subsidies from the superior authority are regulated in the way showed in Figure 8 . In the disparities of actual fiscal revenue among prefecture-level administrative regions, around 65% derive from disparities among provinces, and about 35% derive from disparities within provinces. The absolute values of disparities among and within provinces decrease under the implementation of various transfer payments and subsidies. However, the widening trend of the disparities among provinces remains stable, while the disparities within provinces become smaller. In this process, the government's transfer payments and subsidies have greater influence on decreasing disparities within provinces, which eventually decrease the absolute value of disparities of national fiscal revenue. However, the generally widening trend of disparities of national fiscal revenue fails to be reversed. 
Conclusions
This paper elaborately explores the changes of disparities of fiscal revenue at local administrative and provincial levels in China and how they are influenced by the central government's transfers and subsidies of all kinds, mainly through the calculation and decomposition of Theil index. The results are as follows.
1) According to the calculations, from 1999 to 2009, disparities of actual fiscal revenue across prefecture-level administrative regions continue to expand, which are reflected in a sustained growth of Theil index correspondingly. Approximately, disparities among provinces account for 65%, while disparities within provinces take up the rest 35%. Disparities among provinces will contribute more to the total disparity over time.
2) Taking the disposable fiscal revenue at the local level as an indicator, disparities of fiscal revenue across prefecture-level administrative regions in China gradually diminish, accompanied with a decreasing Theil index. Approximately, disparities among provinces account for 40%, while disparities within provinces take up the remaining 60%. Disparities among provinces will contribute more to the total disparity over time.
3) In the same year, with comparison to the Theil indexes measured by actual and disposable fiscal revenues, the disparities of actual fiscal revenue turn out to be larger, whereas their contribution of disparities within provinces exceeds the counterpart of disposable fiscal revenue. This phenomenon suggests that transfer payments and subsidies not only reduce the absolute value of Theil index and the imbalance of fiscal revenue on the whole, but also adjust the unbalanced internal structure. The latter is principally reflected in the reduction of the contribution of disparities within provinces, and the narrowing of the disparities of fiscal revenue within each province, which is beneficial to the governance of provincial units. In this case, we may give priority to this eclectic policy.
By differentiating the actual fiscal revenue from the disposable fiscal revenue added with transfer payments and subsidies, this paper elaborately analyze the tendencies and internal structures of fiscal revenue of all provinces and the whole country. The outcome suggests that the disparities of fiscal revenue at both local administrative and provincial levels bear a facade of favorably declining, which is virtually attributed to fiscal transfer payments and subsidies.
Without respect to fiscal transfers and subsidies, it turns out just the opposite. The further study of this paper could explore on which and to what extent the sub-items of fiscal revenue contribute to the disparities of fiscal revenue through decomposing Gini coefficient according to the sources of fiscal revenue.
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